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If any society is to exist beyond a single generation, its youth
must be prepared to adopt adult roles that are functional to that
society. Beyond the primary requisites of food, shelter, and
procreation, youth must be socialized' to take on the skills,
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1. Socialization is the process by which an individual acquires the skills
and values, content and knowledge of the group in which the person is, or is
knowledge, values and attitudes of the prevailing social order.
Youth who have difficulty with, or refuse to respond predict-
ably to, social rules and expectations are perceived as a threat to
the maintenance/perpetuation of the culture, and the safety of
the community.
The term status offender is used to define youths whose be-
haviors deviate in certain specified ways from social norms.
Both words in the term are important. The word offender de-
fines a formal legal process, since youth are-and have tradi-
tionally been-arrested, detained, and adjudicated for conduct
which, if committed by persons over 18 years of age, would not
be criminal. Thus, status as defined by age rather than by
specific behavior generates accountability under the Juvenile
Court Law. Status offenses include: running away from home;
habitually refusing to obey the reasonable orders of parents;
truancy; and (in many states) violation of curfew laws.
Formal laws prohibiting such youthful behavior as running
away and defying parents were first established in the Victorian
era to protect the economic, religious, and physical survival of
families and the state.2 These laws operated under the concept
of parens patriae which defines the power of the state to assist
those who, because of their incapacity, are unable to assist
themselves.3 Prohibitions against the above offenses, however,
are still emphasized today in the laws governing the behaviors
of youth. Indeed, the passage of the federal Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 was in no small part
motivated by the following facts: (1) children who are incorrig-
ible, unruly, or beyond parental control, but who commit no
criminal act have accounted for about one-third of Juvenile
Court adjudications; and (2) studies of such systems as the
California Youth Authority4 have shown that approximately
40% of the inmates of juvenile correctional facilities were youth
who had committed no criminal offense.5
While recent changes in juvenile law6 and court policies have
significantly reduced the number of status offenders in state
about to become, a member. See generally, R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND
SOCIAL STRUCTURE (2d ed. 1957).
2. N. KITLRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEFIANCE AND ENFORCED
THERAPY (1971).
3. Id.
4. Bough, Unruly Child and the Law-Toward a Focus on the Family, 23
Juv. JUST. 9 (1972).
5. Saleeby, Hidden Costs: A Study of Detention Practices in California,
CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY (1975).
6. Dixon, Juvenile Justice in Transition, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 469 (1977).
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correctional facilities, the juvenile justice system's authority
and resources have remained the primary intervention method
which attempts to deal with this type of juvenile. This article
will discuss issues relevant to the juvenile court's jurisdiction
over status offenders, and will describe alternative intervention
strategies which have been successfully used over the last few
years. Initially the article will examine justifications used to
explain the formal legal processing of these juveniles, and then
attempt an explanation of behavior patterns of status offenders.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS USED FOR FORMAL LEGAL
PROCESSING OF STATUS OFFENDERS
The philosophical genesis of the juvenile court in this country
involved a new emphasis upon rehabilitation or resocializa-
tion of our youth, rather than social retribution, as had been
emphasized in criminal courts. The prevailing assumptions in
1899 were that most juveniles previously handled by the crimi-
nal court system did not constitute a threat to the lives and
property of others, and were throught to be more amenable to
rehabilitative services than were "hardened adult offenders.
7
The rationale behind rehabilitation of these youthful offenders
was to provide the means and stimulus to become productive
and contributing members of society.
As mentioned earlier, the stability and perpetuation of any
social system requires the acquisition of functional adult
characteristics by "a substantial proportion of the population
during the process of socialization. Thus the requisites ... be-
come the imperatives for any system of child socialization."8
There are at least two societal requisites, referred to in the
literature, which are used by the juvenile court as justification
for formal-legal processing of status offenders: 9
1. Effective control of disruptive forms of behavior; and
2. Adequate socialization.
In any system of child socialization (e.g. home, school,
church), many informal controls are exercised over youth. A
7. N. KITLRIE, supra note 2.
8. Inkeles, Society, Social Structure, and Child Socialization, SOCIALIZA-
TION AND SOCIETY 79 (Clausen ed. 1968).
9. Id. at 83.
raised eyebrow, a stern glance, a paternal/maternal "swat" all
communicate that the youth's behavior is not acceptable or
appropriate. In this manner, childhood behaviors are monitored
and the child is taught that one acts differently in different
situations, e.g., in church, on a playground, at a basketball
game. Adequate childhood socialization prepares the young to
act appropriately in diverse social settings, and more im-
portantly, ensures that society's members will control behavior
which might disrupt efficient social functioning.
Informal monitoring, however, does not always provide ade-
quate controls. When an individual fails to respond to informal
monitoring, formal systems of social regulation are brought to
bear. The juvenile court acts in loco parentis (in place of the
parent) as an agent of the State, to curtail disruptive behavior
and ensure that the young accept the socially defined adult
roles. It should be noted, the mandate of the juvenile court
extends to both the welfare of the juvenile, and the protection of
society as a whole. Since behavior labeled "status offense" does
not constitute imminent danger to the community, in terms of
harm to person or property, we must assume that justification
for juvenile court intervention into the life of the juvenile is
concern for the welfare and protection of the child. If threat to
the community does exist as a result of a juvenile's misbehavior,
we could not accurately classify that type of conduct as a status
offense. This point is crucial, since, as will be discussed, there is
a great deal of controversy and mystification surrounding the
status offender. In addition, regardless of the stated intent and
purpose of the juvenile court, with respect to the welfare of the
minor, there is only a finite set of tools which the court possesses
to implement its purpose. These tools involve detention, adjudi-
cation, wardship (with varying degrees of control), supervision
and counseling within the legal system. At this juncture we need
to examine just what a status offense is; what problems and
needs bring this kind of conduct within the purview of the court;
and the services which have been developed to deal with those
who are labeled as status offenders.
A. What is a Status Offense?
To provide an inclusive definition of the status offense is
difficult because there exists a vast range of behavior, family
problems and social situations which may be labeled status
offenses. To solve this definitional problem, many states have
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used terms such as P.I.N.S. 10 (persons in need of supervision) or
M.I.N.S." (minors in need of supervision). Still other states have
attempted to specify that behavior which constitutes grounds
for court intervention. California, for example, defines the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court as follows:
601. (a) Any person under the age of 18 years who persistently or
habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or direc-
tions of his parents, guardian, or custodian, or who is beyond the
control of such person, or who is under the age of 18 years when he
violated any ordinance of any city or county of this state establish-
ing a curfew based solely on age is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge such, person to be a ward of the
court.
(b) If a school attendance review board determines that the avail-
able public and private services are insufficient or inappropriate to
correct the habitual truancy of the minor, or to correct the minor's
persistent or habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper or-
ders or directions of school authorities, or if the minor fails to respond
to directives of a school attendance review board or to services pro-
vided, the minor is then within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court; provided,
that it is the intent of the Legislature that no minor who is adjudged a
ward of the court pursuant solely to this subdivision shall be removed
from the custody of the parent or guardian except during school
hours. 2
While such a definition as Section 601 of the California Wel-
fare and Institutions Code does provide more specific
guidelines to the court than P.I.N.S. or M.I.N.S., it remains am-
biguous in a number of areas. For example, what constitutes a
"habitual refusal to obey the reasonable and proper orders or
directions?." How do we know whether the family conflict pre-
cipitating a parental complaint of incorrigibility was caused by
fillial disobedience or parental neglect, abuse, or abandon-
ment?13 Since there is most often no empirical evidence of dy-
namics in the family conflict, and no requirement that a prima
facie case be made against a status offending minor in court,
the court's decisions must be primarily based on social investi-
gations made by a probation officer after the alleged offense
has occurred. In the case of runaway youth, for example, it is
10. Calof, Status Offenders and Juvenile Court-A Review of the Problem,
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY (1975).
11. McNulty, Right to Be Left Alone, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 141 (1976).
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
13. California laws relating to youth offenders. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
300 (West Supp. 1977).
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often quite difficult to determine whether the situation at the
youth's home indeed involved an offense by the youth, by the
family, or both.
III. PROFILING THE STATUS OFFENDER
A. The Transition from Child to Adult: Adolescent Dysfunc-
tioning as a Causative Factor Leading to Status Offenses
While a full exploration of the dynamics of adolescence is
beyond the scope of this paper, a number of issues are pertinent
to our discussion. Writers in the field have consistently agreed
about the physiological, psychological and social dilemmas
faced by youth during adolescence. Physical changes at puber-
ty, new relationships, roles, and responsibilities and new social
demands all affect the youth during this period of transition. In
addition, adolescence is that period during which the youth is
expected to internalize14 the values, mores, and role expecta-
tions enabling passage to adult responsibility. The important
adult characteristic developed at this stage of life is the self-
initiated compliance with social expectations. Development of
this behavior pattern is essential because society cannot directly
monitor the vast number of social roles necessary for its surviv-
al. It must depend upon the successful internalization of certain
social values and mores.
In order for these functional adult characteristics to be inter-
nalized, or self-initiated, the social demands made on the
juvenile must be intrinsically rewarding and consistent with the
individual's self-image, social identity, and value system. The
development of a positive, well-integrated self-image is, at best,
a precarious process for an individual as he or she makes the
transition from child to adult. When problems, dysfunction, or
pathology develop in the family or other systems responsible for
socializing the youth, the process of "growing up o.k." becomes
much more difficult. It is this dysfunctioning during adoles-
cence which is often labeled a status offense.
B. Characteristics of the Status Offender
Labeling with such terms as "runaway", "incorrigible", or
"truant" tends to submerge some rather striking differences
within the labelled group. It is not the case that "when you see
one status offender, you've seen them all." Indeed, research
'14. Kelman, Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Pro-
cesses of Attitude Change, 2 L. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 51-60 (1958).
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involving runaways has shown that no uniform set of personali-
ty variables can effectively identify and predict who will run
away.
15
How then can a definitive set of characteristics for status
offenders, generally, be catalogued? If we define our terms
from the perspective of the juvenile, for example, we would
emerge with quite a different picture of the status offender than
if we used the perspective of parents, or intervening agencies
such as the courts, probation department, or mental health of-
fice. Attempts at classifying types of status offenders can, how-
ever, be helpful to our discussion.
1. The Psychological Perspective
In a review of the literature several types of runaway are
identifiable: (1) those whose conduct can be attributed to some
form of psychopathology; (2) those whose behavior cannot be
classified as abnormal; (3) the "rootless," characterized by
pleasure seeking; (4) youth described as "anxious," acutely
aware of problems in their homes; and (5) youth terrified by
involvement in or threat of an incestuous relationship. 16 While
the above classifications may define motivations to "stray,"
rather than characteristics, these distinctions become crucial
when we discuss attempts to ameliorate situations precipitating
"offending" behavior.
Other studies have pointed to the home environment as an
important factor in status offense cases. In particular, it has
been noted that homes of runaways and incorrigible youth are
characterized by high levels of parent-parent and/or parent-
child conflict. 17 In addition, a significant proportion of status
offenders have been found to come from single-parent families,
or families where one natural parent and one "step" parent are
present.' 8 This fact becomes more important when combined
with studies showing, for example, that running away often
results from a lack of effective guidance and control of the
15. Suddick, Runaways: A Review of the Literature, 24 Juv. JUST. 47 (1973).
16. Id.
17. Justice, Running Away: An Epidemic Problem of Adolescence, 11
ADOLESCENCE 365 (1976).
18. LIPSEY AND BERGER, INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT FOR ORANGE COUNTY
REGIONAL JUVENILE DIVERSION PROGRAM (1977).
child, concurrent with parental rejection. 19 Indeed, it should be
noted the vast majority of youth arrested for incorrigibility are
detained on the basis of parental complaints to police. In this
manner, the legal aspects of the complaint tend to override the
conflict between parent and child. To defend against the charge,
the juvenile must convince legal authorities that he or she was
not incorrigible (as alleged by his parents)-not an easy task as
we shall see in later discussion. Instead of concentrating on the
conflict, the courts tend to concentrate on credibility.
2. The Legal Perspective
From the perspective of a caseworker, clinical considerations
are subordinate to the legal status of the youth. An example of
such a perspective can be seen in a study done by the Virginia
Department of Corrections, Division of Youth Services,
concerning the characteristics of status offenders. These clas-
sifications were based upon youth committed to the Virginia
State Board of Corrections during the fiscal years 1974 through
1975:
(1) A child beyond parental control with no history of delin-
quency;
(2) A child beyond parental control who has a minor delin-
quency charge;
(3) A child beyond parental control who has previously been
on probation;
(4) A child who has been in residential care placement and is
beyond the control of the social agency having custody;
(5) A child who is beyond parental control and has previous-
ly been committed to the State Board of Corrections.
Other models tend to classify between children who have
always lived in their parental home and who have had no men-
tal health, special education, or other special services, and chil-
dren who have lived in various homes and institutions and who
have had multiple mental health, special education, and other
special services.20
This type of profiling raises two important points. First, tak-
ing a more formalistic perspective predisposes one to view
youthful offenders in terms of their legal status, to the exclusion
19. Suddick, supra note 15. See also VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORREC-
TIONS-DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES, STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE DIRECT CARE OF
THE DIVISION OF YOUTH SERVICES (1976).
20. Id.
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of personal, familial, and sociological characteristics. Secondly,
one tends to perceive status offenders as embryonic criminals,
and often leads to the conclusion that the former causes the
latter. This group of juvenile criminals, while miniscule when
compared with the total number of youth arrested for status
offenses, has provided proponents of juvenile court jurisdiction
with a dynamic resource. For example, one writer, in disagree-
ment with those who would remove status offenders from court
jurisdiction, points to an analysis of the offense histories of a
sample of youth who appeared before a juvenile court during a
five-year period. He states that of those who appeared, "many
juveniles charged with status offenses had previously been
charged with other types of offenses. ' 21 Another writer suggests
the majority of status offenders represent children who have
inherent problems with authority, who can best be rehabilitated
through the proper use of authority.22
3. Juvenile Self-Perception
For those individuals who are the subjects of our discussion,
those whose "crimes" are primarily a function of their youth,
status offenses take on a different perspective. One cannot easi-
ly comprehend the pain and loneliness of an adolescent who is
incarcerated for running away from a situation which he or she
deemed intolerable. For such youth, the substantive issues
which will allow our social system to exert jurisdiction over
them are secondary considerations. What is important to them
is their survival. While they may not be "surviving" in a way that
is acceptable to the prevailing society, they are reacting adap-
tively, that is, coping the best way-they know how. This author,
for example, has worked with several runaway youth whose
crime was that they no longer cared to be sexually or emotional-
ly molested by alcoholic or disturbed parents. Many of these
youth were classified as habitual runaways, frustrating to
police and probation officers alike, because they would not stay
in their home environment. Nor did they find long-term foster
placement an attractive alternative. When asked how they could
be assisted, these youth generally desire to be independent and
21. Thomas, Are Status Offenders Really So Different: A Comparative
and Longitudinal Analysis, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 438 (1976).
22. Gill, Status Offenders, 27 Juv. JUST. 3 (1976).
self sufficient. To leave these youth alone is an extremely un-
pleasant prospect for those of us who are familiar with the
predators who can take advantage of them. At the same time,
the thought of institutionalization is equally odious. Sexual and
emotional molestations are also present in juvenile correctional
institutions, as well as comingling with criminally sophisticated
youth.
What is needed is an alternative to doing nothing versus incar-
cerating a noncriminal youth. The problem with doing nothing
is that the majority of these youths, who can be characterized as
having a strikingly low level of self-esteem and no strong sense
of self, lack the skills and knowledge to seek and obtain employ-
ment, and lack the social support necessary for "independent"
living. This is also the principal reason why institutionalization
is clinically counterproductive. The fact is that most of these
youth were not afforded the time, support, structure, or love to
develop a positive and integrated self-image at home. To expect
a correctional institution to take the place of a home environ-
ment in preparing youth to participate productively in adult
society is absurd. Since the climate and characteristics of the
institution are sharply different from those in the home, pre-
existing values and identities held by status offenders are easily
subsumed by the powerful predatory influences in the institu-
tion and hence no real effort is made to correct the problems
which brought the juvenile into the court system.
To isolate and identify the entire range of characteristics of
status offenders would take more space than is available to this
article. Other writers, however, have catalogued the causes and
extent of the problem of juvenile status offenders. 23 The diffi-
culty in achieving consensus with respect to status offenders is
due not only to many subpopulations within the total popula-
tion, but also to the different perspectives regarding what
should be done to solve the problem. Indeed, adopting any sing-
le perspective regarding status offenders will necessarily define
the label attached to the youth; the presumptions of etiology; the
place of intervention or treatment; and the specific technologies
to be used in treatment.
It should be noted that problems faced by status offenders are
multilateral in nature. Some of their problems involve their
family, some involve school, some are psychological, and some
23. Burkhart, Child and the Law: Helping the Status Offender, PUBLIC
AFFAIRS COMMIrrEE (N.Y. 1975).
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socio-economic. Therefore, the multi-problem characteristics of
the status offender will require multi-faceted solutions.
IV. MODELS OF REHABILITATION
A. The Medical Model
As discussed earlier, the stated purpose of procedures in
juvenile court is the rehabilitation of the youthful offender. The
legal category, P.I.N.S., was created in New York and California
to define the noncriminal basis for juvenile court jurisdiction.
Inherent in the P.I.N.S. concept is the notion, borrowed from the
mental health model, that delinquent acts can be "cured," and
that rehabilitation is the main reason for incarceration. 24 The
theoretical underpinning for this philosophy is the so called
medical model of rehabilitation. This model sees offenders as
sick, deviant, or deficient and seeks to cure offending behavior
by changing the personality through individual and group
therapy. The empirical validity of this model is crucial, since the
justification for juvenile court intervention with status offend-
ers involves the court's assisting in eliminating the youth's de-
viancy, deficiency, and/or pathology.
For example, if a juvenile is alleged to be a P.I.N.S., use of that
label necessarily implies an emotional or psychological disturb-
ance which the court's intervention seeks to ameliorate or ehmi-
nate. By concentrating on the personality of the juvenile as the
important element of the offense, the court is thereby able to
differentiate treatment needed by the status offender as
compared with treatment for the juvenile criminal. Thus, deten-
tion for the P.I.N.S. is not intended as social retribution, but
rather to "keep the individual in one place so that the court may
utilize its counseling or therapeutic resources to help the indi-
vidual." It should be noted, however, the data indicates that
P.I.N.S. youths have been more likely to be detained than their
delinquent counterparts, have been subjected to more protract-
ed detention than their delinquent counterparts, and, if in-
stitutionalized, have stayed for longer periods of time.
25
24. Halleck, Giving Up the Medical Model?, BEHAVIOR TODAY, Nov. 10,
1975, at 1.
25. Lerman, Delinquency and Social Policy: A Historical Perspective, 22
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 383 (1977).
B. The Normative Model
Another model used by many in the juvenile justice system in
the treatment of status offenders is the normative model of
rehabilitation. Rather than seeking to re-structure the psyche of
the youth, this model postulates that there are certain amounts
and types of deviancy which society can tolerate. Intervention
would therefore seek to bring the offending youth back into
"normative boundaries" using primarily counseling and social
casework within the family environment. This model, also in-
cluded under the psycho-social model of deviance, is different
from the medical model in that the former views the youth in
relation to the normative rules of the prevailing social order.
Regardless of the conceptual model underlying the court's
activities with status offenders, it must be recognized that inter-
vention by the formal court system is limited by the finite
amount of resources, procedures and structural characteristics
of the court. As a result of the limited resources available to the
court in assisting P.I.N.S. or status offending youth, the penalty
for having family or school problems is often more severe, and
less rehabilitative, than if the youth were adjudicated a criminal
delinquent.
C. Translating Philosophical Postulates Into Workable
Programs: The Reality Model
In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice announced the results of its investiga-
tion. The Commission found that nationwide, about one-half of
the youths formally reported as arrested by local police depart-
ments were not sent to court, rather these cases were informally
adjusted by the police. However, approximately two-thirds of
arrested youths experienced detention or lockup for an average
of twelve days.26 The interpretation of this data by a leading
commentator is as follows: "We can reasonably infer that short-
term restraint (social control), not rehabilitative and re-integra-
tive service, is the actual and dominant public policy response
toward youth." 7
Whether social control or rehabilitation should be the domi-
nant purpose of the juvenile court in dealing with status offend-
ers is not, for this author, the important issue. Rather, the issue
26. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 121, 129 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1967).
27. Lerman, supra note 25, at 391.
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posed is what can society do to prevent status offending youths
from persisting in those acts which brought them within the
purview of the court? How is it possible to accomplish "recon-
struction of non-offending community ties '28 while placing the
juvenile in a correctional setting where the very criminal
behavior that is considered so deviant in the free world is
normalcy "behind the walls?" Additionally there are a number
of problems peculiar to juvenile correctional institutions which
further inhibit their ability to achieve any rehabilitative pur-
pose. First, a large number of inmates commit further crimes
once they are released from the institution. Second, rather than
deterring crime these institutions have been perceived as
"breeding grounds" for further criminal behavior.29 Third,
corrections officials have expressed fear that the ever-increas-
ing overcrowding in institutions has led to lessening of staff
control, increased violence inside the institutions, and an inabil-
ity to achieve correctional purposes.3
0
Indeed, a national comparative study of juvenile institutions
found that variation in the success of institutionalization (reduc-
tion in recidivism rates) could not be accounted for by charac-
teristics of the youth. Rather, the variance in success was ac-
counted for by the characteristics and values of the institution
or intervening agency.31 This research demonstrates that the
behavior and characteristics of offending youth were less im-
portant determinants of the institution's success than what was
done to (or for) them, where it was done, and how it was done.
For these and other reasons, attempts to reduce the rate of
detention have been made by members of the juvenile justice
system. The following is an excerpt from a report prepared in
28. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, supra at 45.
29. See Couch, Diverting the Status Offender from the Juvenile Court, 25
JUV. JUST. 18 (1974); Strachan, Benign Neglect of Juvenile Status Crimes, 1 L.
VOLUNTEERS WITH DELINQUENTS 67 (1972). See also WISCONSIN COUNCIL ON CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, FINAL REPORT (1975);
PETERS, ZIMMERMAN AND CLEMENTS, IMPACT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELIN-
QUENCY PREVENTION ACT IN NEBRASKA-FINAL REPORT (1975).
30. BLUM, SOURCES OF INFLUENCE IN THE SOCIALIATION OF CORRECTIONS
WORKERS (1976).
31. STREET, VINTER AND PERROW, ORGANIZATIONS FOR TREATMENT: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS FOR DELINQUENCY (1966).
1967 by the Chief Judge of the Cuyahoga County (Cleveland,
Ohio) Juvenile Court:
Social workers, probation officers, and police officers, who had previ-
ously for all practical purposes made the decision as to the necessity
of detaining the child, reacted strenuously to our screening process
.... The social agencies which staunchly proclaimed their nonpuni-
tive philosophy wanted us to detain children as part of their 'treat-
ment' (sic) process .... 32
The Cuyahoga County study points out the difficulty in imple-
menting reductions in, or alternatives to, detention. In essence,
the vagueness and ambiguity of such terms as "P.I.N.S." or
"status offenders" lend themselves to systems of juvenile
control operating according to unstructured, and often arbi-
trary, discretion. While the author agrees that discretion is a
crucial component to law enforcement and justice system per-
sonnel, the lack of objective criteria for dispositional alterna-
tives is the heart of the problem.
V. DISPOSITIONAL ALTERNATIVES: Too FEW SOLUTIONS
FOR Too MANY PROBLEMS
A. The Problem
In the State of California, law enforcement officers have three
basic dispositional alternatives after placing a youthful offend-
er under arrest. They can, (1) counsel and release the youth
(case closed); (2) make an application for petition to the
juvenile court (promise to appear); or (3) deliver the youth in
custody to the probation officer for determination whether the
youth should be held until a detention hearing by the court or
until dismissal.
In theory, police decisions to release, file an application for
petition, or detain the youth would be a function of the severity
of the youth's current offense, the number of prior offenses, and
the officer's perception of danger posed to the youth or commu-
nity. In practice, however, objectivity of dispositions according
to the offense behavior is very often absent. For example, the
case records of a number of police departments in Southern
California regarding youths detained under Welfare and In-
stitutions Code Section 601 (status offenders) in 1976 presents a
different picture. In a large number of cases where local youths
were delivered in custody to the probation department, the
criteria for detention most often involved parental refusal of
alternative dispositions, refusals for which their child was held
32. Whitlach, Practical Aspects of Reducing Detention Home Population,
24 Juv. JUST. 21 (1973).
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accountable. In similar cases, the youths were detained because
an arrest was made after 5 p.m., when most social service agen-
cies are closed, and no parent or responsible adult was im-
mediately available.
In an evaluation of a county-wide program which diverted
status offenders from entry into the juvenile justice system,
another interesting fact was discovered. Law enforcement offi-
cers were asked to rate those factors they used in determining
dispositions in status offense cases. The two most important
determinants did not involve behavioral severity or number of
prior offenses. Rather, they involved the attitude of the youth
and the attitude of the parents.33 While a useful indicator in the
hands of an experienced juvenile investigator, attitudes display-
ed during a family dysfunction or dispute may not provide an
accurate assessment of the participants' ongoing functioning.
First, a repeat offender may be sophisticated enough to "con"
the investigating officer. Second, one of the most fundamental
characteristics of a crisis situation involves an acute, volatile,
emotional state. Thus, an officer may make a disposition for
current attitude and emotional state which would be quite dif-
ferent if he or she made the same assessment the next morning
after a "cooling off" period.
Law enforcement has traditionally been hampered by a lack
of accessible alternative resources to detention. In addition, a
recent phenomenon called civil liability has impeded law en-
forcement's handling of the wide range of status offender
needs. Police officers are often prohibited from taking any ac-
tions which could result in a lawsuit against the department.
For this reason, they would hesitate to make a direct referral to
a service which was not legally mandated, or with which their
department did not have a contractual relationship limiting
their perceived liability. This concern with civil liability was not
always the case. Twenty or twenty-five years ago, beat pa-
trolmen had their own informal "diversion programs." While
presenting some ethical concerns, 4 this informal handling had
two fundamental and-for this author-effective methods:
33. LIPSEY AND BERGER, INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT FOR ORANGE COUNTY,
REGIONAL JUVENILE DIVERSION PROGRAM 59 (1977).
34i Scharf, The Dilemmas of Diversion, A paper presented to the Novem-
ber 4, 1976 meeting of the American Society of Criminology, p. 3.
1. A "boot" in the pants by the officer at the time of infrac-
tions; and
2. A subsequent "boot" in the pants by parents in the pres-
ence of the officer.
This informal handling, however, was rarely used for youths
and families with whom the officer was not familiar. This was
the officer's "beat" where he solved minor infractions and
maintained order according to his skill and understanding of
his community. With the increasingly more "professional" and
impersonal patrol logistics used in recent times (e.g., sector car
patrols, helicopter patrols), coupled with the transient nature of
the population in many police jurisdictions, much more formal
intervention is used, with government agencies increasingly
taking over the responsibilities which once were demanded of
the parents.
While the use of detention for status offenders is often
screened and reduced by intake probation officers, there is still
a paucity of alternative intervention techniques available to
community agents. Indeed the particular intervention tech-
nique attempted is most often a function of which agency's
jurisdiction the youth falls within. An act attributed to Judge
Pefia of the El Paso, Texas, Juvenile Court can serve as an
example."5
When a boy who had been arrested several times for running
away was brought to the bench, Judge Pefia asked who in the
room was responsible for the care of the youth. Since the par-
ents were not present, the probation officer, who had the youth
on his caseload, the mental health worker, who had seen the
youth in therapy, and the social worker, who had done
casework with the family, all raised their hands. The Judge is
then reported to have said, "I order the three of you to report
back to this Court in [a specified number of] days that you have
ameliorated this problem." When the community agents report-
ed there was nothing they could do, that status offenders were a
most difficult problem for service providers, the Judge
committed an unprecedented act-he cited them for contempt
of court for their failure to solve the runaway problem.
The point of this anecdote is that one of the basic reasons that
status offenders have been described as a difficult and frustrat-
ing population is that problems underlying status offense be-
35. Address presented by F. Nader to the National Youth Service Workers
conference in June of 1976.
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havior are multiple in nature. As such, their resolution requires
multi-faceted solutions, and one agency or court just cannot be
expected to be all things to all people. Further, these problems
are a function of the entire family unit, not just the identified
youth. To make only the youth accountable as the offender, or
to serve as the patient, is to predispose the intervention to
failure.
Given the above problems inherent in the juvenile court's
handling family concerns in a legal-correctional context, a num-
ber of pieces of legislation were enacted to address the issues
believed to contribute to the difficulties faced by the juvenile
court system. While not removing the status offense from the
court's jurisdiction, they nonetheless paved the way, and pro-
vided funds for, more innovative intervention strategies.
B. Some Attempted Solutions
In an effort to respond to some of the problems manifest in
judicial handling of status offenders, the federal government in
1974 passed the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act.36 This Act provided, among other things, funds to states for
the purpose of "de-institutionalizing" the status offender. A
state to receive block grants under the Act would have to give
assurance that, within specified periods of time, no status of-
fender would be detained in or committed to an institution in-
tended for criminal delinquents. While a majority of the states
did participate in the Act's programs, some receiving several
million dollars in federal funds, it should be noted that the Act
was an enabling legislation and did not mandate alternative
handling of the status offender. The Juvenile Justice and Delin-
quency Prevention Act of 1974, while presenting alternative
strategies, depended on the philosophy, politics, and motivation
of local units of government to implement the legislative intent.
One must realize, however, that since a substantial proportion
of the inmates of juvenile institutions were status offenders in
1974, de-institutionalization presented a serious threat to the
juvenile justice system. If status offenders were to be removed
from government institutions, and placed in voluntary, commu-
36. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415,88
Stat. 1109 (1974).
nity-based agencies, the resulting loss in revenue, staff posi-
tions, and concomitant resources could be immense.
While this article is not the place for a discussion of systems
theory, one point is noteworthy. The maintenance and stability
of organized social systems requires a continuous influx of
clientele, just as an automobile factory requires raw materials if
it is to make its product. Such a substantial loss of clientele as
was suggested by the Delinquency Prevention Act met with
predictable resistance by components of the Juvenile Justice
System who were more concerned over budget and organiza-
tions than with individuals.37
Therefore, a number of states found it necessary to mandate
the de-institutionalization of status offenders. The States of
Massachusetts and Florida have closed juvenile institutions to
status offenders. These institutions were replaced by communi-
ty treatment centers, and volunteer short-term foster homes.
In the State of California, the legislature passed in 1976 As-
sembly Bill 3121. This bill sought to "take a hard line" with
serious criminal law violators, while "taking a soft line" with
status offenders. In a previous edition of this Journal, Assemb-
lyman Julian Dixon, one of the authors of the bill, made the
following statement:
The status offender is generally brought within the juvenile system
merely because of his age. Therefore a program to handle status
offenders should offer different treatment than that afforded crimi-
nal offenders . . . Placing status offenders in secure facilities with
criminal offenders mitigates against rehabilitation and hasn't the
counterveiling purpose of protecting the public from the minor's act.
Further, the use of secure facilities to house status offenders is a
misuse of scarce resources and the cost, in terms of that procedure's
potential negative impact on the juvenile status offender, is beyond
calculation. 38
However, in prescience of the outcry from various components
of the legal system, Assemblyman Dixon also stated that, "[I]f,
for example, it is determined that many status offenders can
only be rehabilitated by some new type of limited, secure atten-
tion, then legislation to provide for such will seriously be con-
sidered. '39
While such determinations have not been made empirically,
political pressure moved Mr. Dixon, less than five months after
passage of AB 3121, to author AB 958, a bill which would permit
secure detention of status offenders for 12, 24, 48 hours, or for
37. KATZ AND KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 150 (1966).
38. Dixon, Juvenile Justice in Transition, 4 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 469, 475
(1977).
39. Id. at 478.
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"good cause," longer periods. This author, while recognizing the
difficulty encountered by law enforcement with certain status
offenders who refuse voluntary services and lack the wherewit-
hal to cope safely in the streets, disagrees with the content of AB
958 in two ways.
First, a recent survey of law enforcement agencies in a South-
ern California County4° brought to light the fact that the largest
majority of status offenders can and are being handled through
the voluntary provision of community-based services. A hand-
ful of youths seen by the police do not seem to be amenable to
these voluntary services. Therefore, to create a bill which re-
opens the possibility of "dumping" all status offenders in a
detention facility does not seem warranted. Secondly, according
to law enforcement personnel the only youths who present dif-
ficulties, given the range of alternative services currently avail-
able, are (1) out-of-region runaways with whom the only inter-
vention will be transportation home; (2) youth who persistently
refuse the voluntary provision of services; and (3) youth who
continually recidivate regardless of the attempts at rehabilita-
tion. According to law enforcement estimates, the percentage of
status offending youths in the "problem" categories account for
less than five percent of the total number of status offenders. To
create a bill which may be appropriate for such a small propor-
tion of youth does not appear to warrant passage. The bill
should be amended to limit the possibility of detention to these
three types of problem cases.
In response to the criticism leveled at traditional methods of
handling status offenders, as well as legislation authorizing
change in interverition strategies, a number of alternative serv-
ice systems and diversion techniques have been established.
Use of the term "diversion" has caused some confusion among
various components of the legal system. For our purposes, a
distinction is made between diversion versus reduced penetra-
tion. Diversion dennotes no juvenile justice system involvement
by the youth, beyond the point of arrest. Indeed, all formalized
intervention ceases at that point and the case is "closed". Re-
duced penetration, on the other hand, involves a decision by a
40. This 1977 Survey includes all enforcement jurisdiction in Orange
County, the second most populated county in California, 2.8 million.
legal official to stop further court processing after the youth is
delivered into the hands of the probation officer. Such reduced
penetration could involve formal or informal probation. Practi-
cal differences do exist between the two terms, but we await
research on whether or not services defined as diversion consti-
tute different technologies and outcomes from reduced penetra-
tion.
One important technological aspect of diversion programs
involves an emphasis upon crisis intervention. For example, in
Sacramento County, an experimental program was developed
to see if status offenders could be handled better through short
term family crisis counseling at the time of referral rather than
through the traditional juvenile court process. It was found the
number of court petitions, number of informal probations, days
spent in detention, cost of handling, and recidivism rates were
all less for the individuals involved in a diversion project than
for control cases.4 It should be noted the provision of diversion
services in no way implies that police or probation officers are
not doing their jobs or that counselors staffing diversion pro-
jects should assume the discretionary role of police officers.
Rather, the addition of diversion services serves three basic
functions:
(1) To assist police officers with troubled youths and/or
families;
(2) To assist juveniles and their families in resolving prob-
lems so that the family will be able to cope with problemat-
ic life situations in more productive ways;
(3) To coordinate a range of comprehensive services so that
youths and services will be appropriately matched.
As mentioned earlier, effective diversion programs involve an
orientation toward immediate crisis intervention/counseling.
The fact, for example, that police officers and detention intake
probation officers are on duty 24 hours a day does not necessari-
ly mean that needed social services for youths and their families
will also be "on duty." Crisis intervention reduces the need for
detention by adding an additional tool of intervention short of
holding the juvenile in custody. Indeed, crisis counseling has
been shown to reduce the severity of many status offense situa-
tions by dealing with the immediate, acute problems which of-
ten bring juveniles in contact with the police. Finally, crisis
diversion services free police officers to return to patrol.
41. BARON AND FEENEY, JUVENILE DIVERSION THROUGH FAMILY COUNSEL-
ING-AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT (1976).
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While it is clear that not all status offense cases involve acute
crisis situations, it is also clear the majority of parent com-
plaints of incorrigibility and runaway do arise from a family
crisis. Detention of the juvenile, while perhaps ameliorating the
immediate complaint, does no more than isolate the juvenile
from the family, thus precluding resolution of the crisis situa-
tion and predisposing the juvenile and his or her family to
further problems. Alternatives to detention, where for some
reason the youth is unable or unwilling to go home, have been
developed in such facilities as small, voluntary, temporary shel-
ter care. Another program, such as the one used by the Florida
Division of Youth Services and the Ventura County (California)
Youth Service System is called emergency foster care, or "cool"
homes. In this program, status offenders are placed in carefully
screened and specially trained homes, where, with counseling
and supportive services, the offense situation is stabilized and
the juvenile and his or her family are reunited as soon as possi-
ble.
In addition to shelter facilities, counties have developed re-
gional diversion programs where a range of services are pro-
vided. Among these services are short-term family counseling;
recreational services, skill development, vocational training and
placement, remedial education, and "Big Brother/Big Sister"
volunteer services to youth.42
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, there is a need to develop a comprehensive youth
services system which can provide relevant services to the sev-
eral status offender sub-populations. It is noted that all 601's are
not alike in characteristics, behaviors, or service needs. There
are instances where, for the older youth, service needs would
best be met by skills and procedures relevant to emancipation.
There are substantive differences among service needs for
youth based on age, family structure, presenting and underlying
problems, and severity. Services must be organized according
to the needs defined by unique youth populations, rather than
continuing to subsume youth needs under the style and technol-
ogy of a particular service agency.
42. LIPSEY AND BERGER, supra note 34, at 13-20.

